Coastal ecosystems are increasingly dominated by humans. Consequently, the human dimensions of sustainability science have become an integral part of emerging coastal governance and management practices. But if we are to avoid the harsh lessons of land management, coastal decision makers must recognize that humans are one of the more coastally dependent species in the biosphere. Management responses must therefore confront both the temporal urgency and the very real compromises and sacrifices that will be necessary to achieve a sustainable coastal (...) ecosystem, one that is economically feasible, socially just, and ecologically sound. (shrink)

PHOTO ID 121339257© Designer491| Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT When physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be apparent conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters future physicians’ commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. We use an ethical dilemma that was presented to a group of third-year medical students to examine how ethics education might be causing (...) them to give undue deference to autonomy, thereby undermining their commitment to beneficence. INTRODUCTION The right of patients to choose which treatments they prefer is rooted in today’s social mores and taught as a principle of medical ethics as respect for autonomy. Yet, when physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be a conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters a commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. I. An Ethical Dilemma The impetus for this paper arose when students who were completing their third clinical year discussed a real-life ethical dilemma. A middle-aged man developed a pulmonary hemorrhage while on blood thinners for a recently placed coronary stent. The bleeding was felt to be reversible, but the patient needed immediate intubation or he would die. The cardiologist was told that the patient previously expressed to other physicians that he never wanted to be intubated. However, the cardiologist made the decision to intubate the patient anyway, and the patient eventually recovered.[1] Students were asked if they believed that the cardiologist had acted ethically. Their overwhelming response was, “No, the patient should have been allowed to die.” We looked into how students applied ethical reasoning to conclude that this outcome was ethically preferred. To explore how the third-year clinical experience might have formed the students’ judgment, we presented the same case to students who were just beginning their third year. Their responses were essentially uniform in recommending intubation. While there is likely more than one reasonable view in this case, we agree with the physician and the younger medical students that intubation was the ethically appropriate decision and will present an argument for it. But first, we explain the reasoning behind the more advanced medical students’ decision to choose patient autonomy at the expense of beneficence. II. Medical Ethics Education and the Priority of Autonomy Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, first published in 1979 and now in its 8th edition, is a significant part of the formal ethics education in medical school.[2] Students learn an ethical decision-making approach based on respect for four ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. While Beauchamp and Childress officially afford no prima facie superiority to any principle, the importance of respect for patient autonomy has increased through the editions of their book. For example, early editions of their book opposed the legalization of physician-assisted death compared to recent editions that defended it.[3] As another example, Beauchamp and Childress make paternalism harder to justify by adding an autonomy-protecting condition to the list of conditions for acceptable paternalism.[4] Authority, they contend, need not conflict with autonomy—provided the authority is autonomously chosen.[5] “The main requirement,” they write, “is to respect a particular patient’s or subject’s autonomous choices, whatever they may be.[6] In the principlism of Beauchamp and Childress, autonomy now seems to have a kind of default priority.[7] However, the bioethics discourse has strong counternarratives, noting some movement to elevate the role of beneficence and to respect the input of stakeholders, including the family and the healthcare team. Ethics education achieves particular relevance in the third clinical year when students become embedded in the care of patients and learn from what has been called the informal curriculum. They observe how attending physicians approach day-to-day ethical problems at the patient’s bedside. In this context, students observe the importance of informed consent for serious treatments or invasive procedures, a practice that highlights the principle of patient autonomy. In both the formal and informal curriculum, medical students observe how, in the words of Paul Wolpe, “patient autonomy has become the central and most powerful principle in ethical decision-making in American medicine.”[8] In short, students appear to learn a deference for patient autonomy. This curricular shift in favor of autonomy coincides with legal developments that protect patients’ rights and decision-making with respect to their healthcare choices. The priority of autonomy in medicine benefits patients by reflecting their choices and, in some cases, their fundamental liberty. III. The Practice of Medicine and the Commitment to Beneficence There are many critiques of the dominant place that autonomy has in biomedical ethics,[9] especially considering that autonomy seems to be biased toward individualistic, Western, and somewhat American culture-driven values.[10] In addition, many bioethical dilemmas are cast as a conflict between autonomy and beneficence. Our point is that medical students bring to their study of medicine a commitment to beneficence that seems to be suppressed by practical ethics education. We think this commitment is rationally defensible and should be nurtured. It is striking that young medical students have a pre-reflective commitment to beneficence at all. For, as we mentioned, it is not just medicine but Western culture generally that prioritizes autonomy in settling ethical dilemmas. In wanting to act for the good of others (rather than simply agreeing to what others want), physicians are already swimming somewhat against the cultural tide.[11] However, doing so makes sense, given the nature of medicine and the profession of healing. When prospective medical students are asked why they wish to become physicians, the usual answer is some variation on caring for the sick and preventing disease. It is unlikely that a reason to become a physician is to respect a patient’s autonomy. It would be easy to dismiss medical students’ commitment to beneficence as a mere intuition and contrary to a more reasoned and deliberative approach. Beauchamp and Childress seem to minimize the value of physician intuition, stating that justifications for certain procedures are “…supported by good reasons. They need not rest merely in intuition or feeling.”[12] Henry Richardson writes that “situational or perceptive intuition…leaves the reasons for decision unarticulated.”[13] We think this is a crude and rather thin way of understanding intuition. Some bioethicists have defended intuition as essential to the practice of medicine and not something opposed to reason.[14] In the case we describe, we believe the ethical justifications s for the patient’s intubation are fundamentally sound: the patient did not have a “do not intubate” order written in the chart, the emergency intubation had not been foreseen, so the patient did not have the opportunity to consent to or reject intubation; the patient had consented to the treatment for his cardiac disease so his consent for intubation could have been assumed;[15] and the consequences of respecting his autonomy did not justify allowing him to die.[16] While it is possible to have more than one reasonable view on this case, we think the case for beneficence is strong and certainly should not be dismissed out of hand. We do not deny that if a patient makes a clearly documented, well-informed decision to forgo intubation that this decision ought to be respected by the physician (even if the physician disagrees with the patient’s decision). But, in this situation, as in many others in the practice of medicine, the patient’s real wishes and preferences are not well-articulated in advance. There are many cases where a physician acts based on what she believes the patient, or the surrogate, would want, sometimes in situations that do not allow much time for reflection. An example might be resuscitation of a newborn at the borderline of viability. In their ethics education, beneficence would mean acting first to save a life. If the patient or surrogate makes an informed decision to the contrary, a beneficent physician respects that autonomous decision. In the case presented, the patient expressed gratitude to the cardiologist when extubated. But what if he had expressed anger at the physician for violating his autonomy? There are those who could argue that not only was intubation ethically wrong but that the cardiologist put himself in legal jeopardy by his actions (especially if there had been a written refusal applicable to the specific situation). In the example we use, we point out that the cardiologist may not have escaped a lawsuit if the patient had died without intubation. His family, when hearing the circumstances, may have sued for failure to act and dereliction of the cardiologist’s duty to save him. Beyond a potential legal challenge for either action or inaction, there is an overriding ethical question the cardiologist had to address: what course would be most satisfying to his conscience? Would he rather allow a patient to die for fear of recrimination, or act to save his life, regardless of the personal consequences? In the absence of real knowledge about the patient’s considered wishes, it is most reasonable to err on the side of promoting patient well-being. A physician’s commitment to beneficence is not necessarily a way of undermining a patient’s autonomy. In acting for the patient's good, physicians are also acting on what it is reasonable to believe a patient (or most patients, perhaps) would want, which is obviously connected to what a patient does want. Pellegrino and Thomasma argue that beneficence includes respect for a patient’s autonomy since “the best interests of the patient are intimately linked with their preferences.”[17] Instead of conceptualizing ethical dilemmas in medicine as conflicts between autonomy and beneficence, it is possible that medical schools could teach students that truly practicing beneficence is a way of valuing patient autonomy, especially when the patient’s wishes are not specific to the situation and are not clearly expressed. CONCLUSION It is important for students and practicing physicians to understand the principle of respect for patient autonomy in a pluralistic society that demands personal self-determination. However, the role of the physician as a beneficent healer should not be diminished by this respect for autonomy. Respecting a patient’s autonomy is grounded in and manifested by physician beneficence.[18] That is, seeking what is good for the patient can only be good if it respects their personhood and dignity. We propose that a commitment to beneficence, incipient in young medical students, should be developed over time with their other clinical reasoning skills. Such a commitment need not be sacrificed on the altar of patient autonomy. Beneficence needs greater relative moral weight with students as they proceed in their ethics education. - [1] S. Jauhar, “When Doctors Need to Lie,” New York Times, February 22, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/opinion/sunday/when-doctors-need-to-lie.html. [2] T. L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019). [3] Louise A. Mitchell, “Major Changes in Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14, no. 3 (2014): 459–75, https://doi.org/10.5840/ncbq20141438. [4] Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 238. [5] Beauchamp and Childress, 103. [6] Beauchamp and Childress, p. 108. [7] For other accounts that prioritize autonomy, see e.g. Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 38–39; R Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for Autonomy Should Be ‘First among Equals,’” Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 5 (October 2003): 307–12, https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.29.5.307. For examples of critiques of these accounts, see footnote 9. [8] P. R. Wolpe, “The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View,” in Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, p. 43. [9] V. A. Entwistle et al., “Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of Clinician-Patient Relationships,” Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 7 (July 2010): 741–45; C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law, 1st ed. (Oxford ; Hart Publishing, 2009); O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, The Gifford Lectures, University of Edinburgh 2001 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). [10] P. Marshall and B. Koenig, “Accounting for Culture in a Globalized Bioethics,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics: A Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32, no. 2 (2004): 252–66; R. Fan, “Self-Determination vs. Family-Determination: Two Incommensurable Principles of Autonomy,” Bioethics 11, no. 3–4 (1997): 309–22. [11] Arguments stressing the importance of beneficence, as ours does here, certainly approach paternalistic arguments. We set aside the complex issue of paternalism for purposes of this paper and simply note that the principle of beneficence as such does not say anything specifically about acting against the patient’s will. In the case study that focuses this paper, we do not believe the patient’s will or wishes were clearly indicated. [12] Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, p. 20, see note 2 above. [13] H. S. Richardson, “Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting Bioethical Principles,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 25, no. 3 (January 1, 2000): 285–307, p. 287. [14] H. D. Braude, Intuition in Medicine a Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning (Chicago ; University of Chicago Press, 2012). [15] R. Kukla, “Conscientious Autonomy: Displacing Decisions in Health Care,” The Hastings Center Report 35, no. 2 (2005): 34–44. [16] M. Schermer, The Different Faces of Autonomy: Patient Autonomy in Ethical Theory and Hospital Practice, vol. 13, Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002). [17] E. D. Pellegrino and D. C. Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good - the Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 29. [18] Pellegrino and Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good. 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This detailed 1990 book describes the light and dark adaptation of receptoral and post-receptoral mechanisms from a number of perspectives. The authors emphasise the importance of the study of achromatopsia, a rare congenital condition in which the visual mechanisms that mediate day vision are absent whilst those that mediate night vision remain intact.

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

pt. 1. A critique of current educational aims.--pt. 2. Reason.--pt. 3. Education and reason.

ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF A VIOLATION OF NATURAL LAW IS NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVED IN THE IDEA OF THE MIRACULOUS, THERE IS "ONE KIND" OF MIRACLE WHICH SEEMS TO INVOLVE IT. HUME’S DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR MIRACLES RELATES TO THIS KIND AND IS INTERPRETABLE AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS POSSIBILITY. ALSO THERE IS AN ARGUMENT THAT THE EXPRESSION "VIOLATION OF NATURAL LAW" SIGNIFIES A CONFUSION IN WHICH THE IDEAS OF NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL LAW COLLAPSE INTO EACH OTHER. NEITHER OF (...) THESE ARGUMENTS IS EFFICACIOUS. FURTHERMORE, THE CONTENTION THAT THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS ESTABLISHING THE "ABSENCE" OF A NATURAL CAUSE IS OPEN TO OBJECTION. HOWEVER, TO BE CONCEIVED AS A VIOLATION OF NATURAL LAW, A MIRACLE MUST BE THOUGHT OF AS AN OCCURRENCE WHICH IS BOTH EMPIRICALLY CERTAIN AND CONCEPTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE--WHICH OUGHT TO MAKE THE NOTION RIDICULOUS. AND YET IT NEED NOT. (shrink)

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

Based on results of an experiment, hypotheses are tested concerning the effects of computer use on decision commitment. The experiment required subjects to make an adoption decision regarding a hypothetical government agency's innovation. Subjects could choose from a variety of information sets, some computer based, some not, before making the decision. After their decision the subjects were given “new evidence” that contradicted their initial position. Two experimental treatments included more difficult access to the computer-based information and higher cost for the (...) computer-based information. Results indicate that access difficulty diminishes confidence in decisions and leads to lesser commitment. However, the cost of the computer information seems to have little bearing on decision commitment. (shrink)

Reading the Republic without reference to the less familiar Laws can lead to a distorted view of Plato's political theory. In the Republic the philosopher describes his ideal city; in his last and longest work he deals with the more detailed considerations involved in setting up a second-best 'practical utopia.' The relative neglect of the Laws has stemmed largely from the obscurity of its style and the apparent chaos of its organization so that, although good translations now exist, students of (...) philosophy and political science still find the text inaccessible. This first full-length philosophical introduction to the Laws will therefore prove invaluable. The opening chapters describe the general character of the dialogue and set it in the context of Plato's political philosophy as a whole. Each of the remaining chapters deals with a single topic, ranging over material scattered through the text and so drawing together the threads of the argument in a stimulating and readily comprehensible way. Those topics include education, punishment, responsibility, religion, virtue and pleasure as well as political matters and law itself. Throughout, the author encourages the reader to think critically about Plato's ideas and to see their relevance to present-day philosophical debate. No knowledge of Greek is required and only a limited background in philosophy. Although aimed primarily at students, the book will also be of interest to more advanced readers since it provides for the first time a philosophical, as opposed to linguistic or historical, commentary on the Laws in English. (shrink)

R. F. Stalley; VIII*—Plato's Doctrine Of Freedom, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 145–158, https://doi.org/10.11.

A critical and constructive discussion of philosophical questions which have particular bearing on the formulation of educational aims.

R F Dearden; Competition in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–133, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

The idea of freedom plays a key role in Plato's moral and political thought. In the Republic justice is shown to be beneficial because the just man alone is truly free. There are parallels here with modern discussions of freedom. The Laws argues that to be free a city must avoid the extremes of liberty and of authoritarianism. The legislator should rely on persuasion, not force, so that people willingly obey his laws. The underlying idea is that we are free (...) if we willingly follow the demands of reason rather than being coerced by external forces or by unruly desires. (shrink)

In this book a distinguished group of environmental experts argues that in order to solve global environmental problems, we must view them in a broad interdisciplinary perspective that recognizes the relations—the interconnected circle—among ecology, economics, and ethics. Currently the circle is broken, they say, because environmental policy is decided on short-term estimations of material that take little account of the economic or moral burdens that will be borne by future generations if we deplete our resources now. We must, assert the (...) authors, have a better knowledge of the science underlying our environmental problems, we must understand their causes and consequences in relation to our economic and political systems, and we must recognize that an effective response will require a shift in a technologically oriented society’s ethical attitude toward the natural environment. The authors address a wide range of concerns from global atmospheric degradation and spreading toxification of the environment to loss of forests and massive species extinctions. They offer to general readers, students, and professionals practical assessments and remedies for many of these problems. They suggest, for example, mechanisms that provide economic incentives for conservation; engineering and technical adaptations to use resources more effectively and dispose of waste products; better economic accounting procedures for measuring the real environmental costs of our depletion of natural resources; and a remodeled education system that better prepares us to see each individual’s responsibility to the environment. (shrink)

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

R. F. Stalley; VIII*—Plato's Doctrine Of Freedom, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 145–158, https://doi.org/10.11.

R F Dearden; Education and Politics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–156, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.198.

R. F. Holland; I*—The Presidential Address: Euthyphro, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 1–16, https://doi.org/10.

R F Dearden; Freedom and the Development of Autonomy: a reply to Victor Quinn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–27.

Even today, a century after the publication of the “Origin of Species”, current zoological literature often reveals an insufficient grasp of the implications of the now generally accepted view that it is natural selection that confers direction on the evolutionary process.This is, in part, due to a reaction against oversimplified teleology and against Lamarckism. In rejecting Lamarck's thesis that the activities of an animal directly affect its hereditary characters it is frequently assumed that this implies that such activities are irrelevant (...) to the study of evolution. This is a non-sequitur, for activities may affect evolution not directly, through heredity, but indirectly, by influencing the direction of the selective forces impinging on the organism. Reasons are given for concluding that changes in habits and behaviour frequently precede structural change and, in fact, determine the direction of the latter.As an example of a concept which deserves a more evolutionary treatment than it commonly receives, the subject of neoteny is considered. It appears that failure to think in terms of the selective forces involved has frequently led to error. An analysis in functional terms is made of the theory that the chordates represent secondarily glorified sea-squirts and it is concluded that this idea is unlikely to be correct. The characteristics of man that are commonly considered to be neotenous are also discussed. It is concluded that a facile and unanalytical application of the label “neoteny” to many of the evolutionary changes involved has tended to obscure rather than to clarify their significance: the neotenous features of man are not those that have been of primary importance in human evolution, but are secondary to the acquisition of new characters which are not to be found in either the adult or the young stages of any other primate.Aujourd'hui, un siècle après l'apparition de l'Originedes Espèces, la conviction est presque générale que la sélection naturelle dirige le procès de l'évolution. Néanmoins, les publications zoologiques actuelles révèlent souvent une compréhension insuffisante de ce qui en résulte.Ceci doit en partie être considéré comme réaction contre une téléologie simpliste et contre le Lamarckisme. En rejetant la thèse de Lamarck, que les activités d'un animal ont une influence directe sur ses caractéristiques héréditaires, on admet fréquemment que de pareilles activités n'ont rien à voir avec l'étude le l'évolution. Cependant, une telle conclusion n'est pas justifiée, car les activités peuvent influer sur l'évolution non pas directement, par la voie de l'hérédité, mais indirectement en agissant sur la direction des forces sélectives que l'organisme rencontre. Des raisons ont été données qui mènent à conclure que des changements dans les habitudes et dans le comportement précèdent maintes fois le changement structural et même déterminent la direction de celui-ci.Comme exemple d'un concept qui mérite un traitement plus évolutionniste qu'il ne reçoive en général, la néoténie a été examinée. Il paraît que l'on a fait beaucoup d'erreurs en ne tenant pas compte des forces sélectives engagées. Une analyse au pointde-vue de la fonction a été appliquée à la théorie que les chordées ne sont que des ascidies néoténiques transfigurées par après, et il s'ensuit que cette idée n'est probablement pas correcte. Aussi les caractéristiques de l'homme généralement regardées comme neoténiques ont été discutées. Il en résulte que, en désignant légèrement et sans analyse plusieurs changements évolutionnaires comme néoténie, on a plutôt obsurci qu'éclairci leur signification. Ce ne sont pas les traits néoteniques de l'homme qui ont joué le rôle principal dans l'évolution humaine; au contraire, ils n'apparaissent qu'après l'acquisition de quelques nouvelles caractéristiques qui ne se trouvent ni dans l'adulte ni dans les phases plus jeunes des autres primates.Sogar heutzutage, ein Jahrhundert nach dem Erscheinen der „Origin of Species”, zeigt die jetzige zoologische Literatur oft eine unzulängliche Einsicht in die Folgerungen, zu denen die jetzt allgemein akzeptierte Annahme leitet, dass die natürliche Selektion die Richtung des Evolutionsprozesses bedingt.Dies ist teilweise zu sehen als eine Reaktion gegen eine einseitige Teleologie und gegen das Lamarckismus. Bei der Ablehnung der TheseLamarck's, dass die Aktivitäten eines Tieres einen direkten Einfluss ausüben auf seine erbliche Konstitution, nimmt man oft an, dass dies bedeutet, dass derartige Aktivitäten demnach nichts zur Sache tun bei dem Studium der Evolution. Zu einer derartigen Konklusion ist man jedoch nicht berechtigt, denn, obwohl die Aktivitäten die Evolution nicht direkt beeinflussen können mittels der Erblichkeit, so können sie dies jedoch indirekt, weil sie die Richtung der selektiven Kräfte, welche auf das Organismus einwirken, bestimmen. Es werden Argumente gegeben, welche die Konklusion rechtfertigten, dass Änderungen in Gewohnheit und Verhalten oft Strukturänderungen vorhergehen und tatsächlich die Richtung dieser letztgenannten bestimmen. Die Neotenie wirdt als ein Beispiel eines Begriff betrachtet, welcher eine mehr evolutionäre Behandlung verdient als bisher geschehen ist. Es ergibt sich dass man viele Irrtümer hat gemacht, indem man den betreffenden selektiven Kräften keine Rechnung getragen hat. Eine Analyse der Theorie, welche die Chordaten als neotenische Ascidien betrachtet, wird von einem funktionellen Gesichtspunkt aus durchgeführt. Daraus scheint der Schluss berechtigt, dass diese Theorie falsch ist. Auch werden die menschlichen Kennzeichen, welche gewöhnlich als neotenische betrachtet werden, besprochen. Die Konklusion lautet, dass, wenn man leichtfertig und ohne genügende Analyse den Zettel „Neotenie“ für mancherlei evolutive Änderungen anwendet, man die richtige Bedeutung dieser Erscheinung vielmehr verdunkelt als aufklärt: nicht die neotenische Kennzeichen des Menschen sind am wichtigsten in seiner Evolution; in Gegenteil sie erscheinen nur sekundär, nachdem die neuen Kennzeichen, welche sich weder in den Erwachsenen noch in den jüngeren Stadien von den anderen Primaten finden lassen, erschienen sind. (shrink)